OECD Employment Effective tax rates on taking up work when claiming minimum income benefits


Beskrivelse av datasettet

This indicator measures the financial disincentives to participate in the labour market. It shows the proportion of earnings in the new job that are lost to either higher tax liabilities and/or lower benefit entitlements when a jobless person takes up employment and their family claims social assistance and/or Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) benefits. Higher values means higher financial disincentives. Calculations for families with children assume 2 children aged 4 and 6 who do not use formal childcare.

KategoriOECD Employment Effective tax rates on taking up work when claiming minimum income benefits1132
AGE CHILDREN4 and 6 yearsY4_6
BENEFIT TYPEGuaranteed minimum incomeGMI
CHILDCARE USENoNO
CONTRIBUTIONNot applicable_Z
FREQAnnualA
HOUSEHOLD TYPECouple, 2 childrenC_C2
HOUSE BENEFITNoNO
INCOME CURR100% of average wageAW100
INCOME PART100% of average wageAW100
IndikatorChanges in tax and benefit amounts when starting a new jobTLBDSNJ
RegionAustraliaAUS
SOC ASS BENEFITNot applicable_Z
TEMP INTOWORK BENEFITNoNO
UNEMP DURATIONNot applicable_Z
EnhetPercentage of earnings in the new jobPT_EARN_NEW_JOB
Periode2001 - 2025
RegjeringIkke valgt
KonjunkturerIkke valgt
KrigIkke valgt
NaturkatastrofeIkke valgt
PandemiIkke valgt
Hendelse eller ulykkeIkke valgt
Nettadresse til datakildenhttps://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?fs[0]=Topic%2C0%7CEmployment%23JOB%23&pg=0&fc=Topic&bp=true&snb=3...