OECD Employment Effective tax rates on taking up work when claiming minimum income benefits


Dataset description

This indicator measures the financial disincentives to participate in the labour market. It shows the proportion of earnings in the new job that are lost to either higher tax liabilities and/or lower benefit entitlements when a jobless person takes up employment and their family claims social assistance and/or Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) benefits. Higher values means higher financial disincentives. Calculations for families with children assume 2 children aged 4 and 6 who do not use formal childcare.

CategoryOECD Employment Effective tax rates on taking up work when claiming minimum income benefits1132
AGE CHILDREN4 and 6 yearsY4_6
BENEFIT TYPEGuaranteed minimum incomeGMI
CHILDCARE USENoNO
CONTRIBUTIONNot applicable_Z
FREQAnnualA
HOUSEHOLD TYPECouple, 2 childrenC_C2
HOUSE BENEFITNoNO
INCOME CURR100% of average wageAW100
INCOME PART100% of average wageAW100
MEASUREChanges in tax and benefit amounts when starting a new jobTLBDSNJ
RakaakayAustraliaAUS
SOC ASS BENEFITNot applicable_Z
TEMP INTOWORK BENEFITNoNO
UNEMP DURATIONNot applicable_Z
UNIT MEASUREPercentage of earnings in the new jobPT_EARN_NEW_JOB
Wakti2001 - 2025
DoolatNot selected
Economic conditionsNot selected
WarNot selected
Natural disasterNot selected
PandemicNot selected
Incident/accidentNot selected
Data source URLhttps://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?fs[0]=Topic%2C0%7CEmployment%23JOB%23&pg=0&fc=Topic&bp=true&snb=3...